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Abstract
This paper analyses the dynamic interaction between monetary and fiscal policies in the
presence of bureaucratic corruption. Corruption constrains the fiscal capacity to tax and
increases the reliance on inflation (seigniorage). Given the restrictions that corruption im-
poses, a monetary reform strengthening central bank independence induces strategic debt
accumulation; the government has the incentive to use debt and indirectly ‘force’ the cen-
tral bank to pursue expansionary monetary policy. This result is augmented by the size
of bureaucratic corruption, posing difficulties on the achievement of both a balanced debt
process and price stability. The adverse implication of corruption on debt accumulation,
given central bank independence, is supported in a large cross-sectional event study for de-
veloped and developing countries. Complementing the analysis with a measure for the level
of independence each central bank reform enacted, the impact of corruption is greater, the
higher the degree of independence granted. The results are also confirmed when accounting
for countries that did not forego meaningful reforms and our findings are robust to different
sub-samples, control variables and unobserved heterogeneity.
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Introduction
Central bank independence (CBI) is widely accepted as the institutional remedy that contributes
to price stability. Since 1990s the majority of statutes around the world have been rewritten,
strengthening the central bank’s political and economic autonomy. International organisations
have promoted central bank reforms in emerging and developing countries and by 2007 about
thirty countries have been operating under a highly autonomous inflation-targeting framework.
However, despite the wide consensus and adoption of such an institutional reform, the monetary
and fiscal performance of these countries has been diverse, especially across developed and
developing countries. Several contributions suggest that the impact of reforms on inflation,
inflation volatility and growth is sensitive to country and time samples, control variables and
model specifications.1 These mixed empirical results ultimately place the effectiveness of central
bank reforms under uncertainty.
This wave of central bank reforms is closely related to the macroeconomic literature of
monetary policy inconsistency and remedial institutional designs (Barro and Gordon (1983),
Rogoff (1985)). In this context, a number of contributions (initiated by Sargent and Wallace
(1981) and Alesina and Tabellini (1987)) have established the importance of fiscal policy in
determining the inflation bias and thus the optimal monetary design. However, the relevance
of the stance and quality of fiscal institutions to the optimal design has received less attention.
Bureaucratic corruption, among other things, limits the fiscal capacity to tax and affects the
government’s fiscal decisions. Indeed, there is both theoretical and empirical evidence on the
negative impact of corruption on tax revenues and the government’s budget, strongly indicating
the importance of incorporating such features in the analysis of monetary and fiscal policy
interactions.
The aim of this paper is to reassess theoretically and empirically the optimality of central
bank independence when active fiscal policy, debt dynamics and bureaucratic corruption are
explicitly considered. At a theoretical level, we readdress the time-inconsistency problem of
monetary policy focusing on the driving forces of monetary and fiscal policymaking when the
economy is faced with suboptimal fiscal institutions, notably in the presence of a corrupt bu-
reaucracy in the tax collection system. As such, we augment the framework of Alesina and
Tabellini (1987) to include tax leakages due to corruption and focus on a two period model to
allow for dynamic effects to take place. This way we highlight (i) the bearing of bureaucratic
corruption in shaping and constraining fiscal policy and (ii) the role of debt policy and its impact
on monetary outcomes and the optimal institutional design.
Our main theoretical finding suggests that in the presence of corruption price stability is
undermined through the strategic use of debt. Even with central bank independence, the gov-
ernment may have the incentive to indirectly ‘force’ an expansionary monetary policy by ac-
cumulating debt. Intuitively, an independent central bank is overcorrecting for the inflation
bias, delivering too little inflation (seigniorage) from the government’s perspective. At the same
time, high bureaucratic corruption is limiting fiscal tax revenues. As a result, the government
1See Berger, Haan, and Eijffinger (2001) for a survey on earlier cross-sectional studies. More recent contribu-
tions employ panel data analyses.
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is induced to borrow more today in an attempt to increase future inflation. Hence, the level
of bureaucratic corruption can restrict the effectiveness of a monetary institutional reform by
‘altering’ fiscal responses and constraining the extent of actual independence.
The theoretical implications provide potential interpretations for a set of empirical findings.
First, they provide a reason for the observed diversity of performance of different countries that
adopted similar central bank reforms. Second, they offer an explanation as to why many coun-
tries have experienced debt increases following important reforms.2 They also give a rationale
for the focus on debt ceilings. The explicit theoretical channel identified here gives emphasis to
strategic borrowing due to the interplay between fiscal and monetary policy actions under cen-
tral bank independency and suboptimal fiscal institutions. Consequently, our empirical analysis
concentrates on the relationship between debt accumulation and bureaucratic corruption after
central bank independence has been legislated.
In a cross-sectional event study setting, CBI is approximated by the timing of a significant
central bank reform. The impact of corruption on debt evolution after that point (relative to
before) is then examined. In addition, the analysis is complemented by a newly complied mea-
sure for the level of legal independence each reform provided. The sample covers 77 developed
and developing countries and reforms span throughout 1990s and beginning of 2000s. Our main
results are consistent with the theoretical implications and indicate that corruption plays a sig-
nificant and negative role in debt accumulation. More importantly, the effect of corruption on
debt accumulation is stronger, the higher the magnitude of the respective reform. We also inves-
tigate and confirm the impact of corruption on debt accumulation in a difference-in-differences
setting, accounting for countries that did not forego meaningful reforms. The results prove to
be robust to a set of sensitivity tests that allow for different subsamples, specifications, control
variables and unobserved heterogeneity.
This work is linked to three literatures. The first one focuses on the role of debt within
the monetary inconsistency game, as done for example by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997a,b).
The possibility of a (positive or negative) strategic use of debt also emerges in their work
when governments are myopic or opportunistic. Here, we provide for an alternative reasoning;
namely, due to corruption, fiscal institutions are suboptimal and that generates incentives for
strategic public borrowing, when the monetary authority is ‘too conservative’. The second strand
concentrates on bureaucratic corruption. The macroeconomic literature on corruption mainly
focuses on its consequences for economic growth, but it lacks systematic analysis of its impact on
macroeconomic policymaking.3 Huang and Wei (2006) are the first to incorporate bureaucratic
corruption in the static Alesina and Tabellini (1987) framework, however the response and
importance of debt policy is disregarded. The third refers to event studies in the empirical CBI
literature, which have been recently growing.4 These contributions predominantly concentrate
on the impact of inflation targeting reforms on inflation and output. Here, the focus is on a
broader concept of central bank reforms, while debt accumulation is the principal variable of
2See, for instance, Cabral and Ozkan (2008) and Daniel, Callen, Terrones, Debrun, and Allard (2003) for a
discussion on public debt increases for emerging markets.
3Exceptions are, for example, Blackburn, Haque, and Neanidis (2008) who investigate the impact of corruption
on seigniorage and through it on growth.
4For instance, Ball and Sheridan (2005), Daunfeldt and de Luna (2008) and Brito and Bystedt (2010).
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interest. Hence, we explore the fiscal discipline effect of central bank independence, in relation
to the level of corruption. A contribution closer to ours is Acemoglu, Johnson, Querubin,
and Robinson (2008) who, using a generic politics redistributive approach, give theoretical and
empirical support to the idea that reforms will be more successful at intermediate levels of
constraints to politicians. They also provide preliminary support of a ‘seesaw effect’ on fiscal
outcomes. Our work is similar in identifying the importance of institutional distortions in
assessing the effectiveness of reforms, albeit the theoretical mechanisms and empirical strategies
are distinct. We focus on a structural institutional distortion, namely, fiscal capacity to tax
and within a standard macro-policy game we investigate the interactions between monetary and
fiscal policy decisions. On the empirical side, we use a larger sample, but focus on the short-run
debt response in relation to corruption, while they focus more on the long-run effect of the
reform on inflation (and partially on government expenditure).
The remaining of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model.
Section 3 determines the policy decisions and outcomes under the distinct institutional settings:
commitment (second best), discretion, decentralisation of policies, focusing on central bank
independence. The empirical analysis is conducted in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model builds on the static Alesina and Tabellini (1987) and Huang and Wei (2006) frame-
works while integrating the dynamic setting of Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997a). There are
three main agents that live for two periods. The private sector consists of firms that determine
output supply, and workers that provide labour and set inflation expectations. The government
is responsible for the fiscal policy, setting government spending, distortionary taxes and debt,
and the central bank controls monetary policy by setting inflation directly. In this setting we
incorporate the analysis of bureaucratic corruption in a dynamic environment.5
2.1 Private Sector
The private sector is characterised by a continuum of firms that are both price and wage takers
and seek to maximise their after-tax profits. The tax rate (τt) is incorporated as a fraction
of revenues and thus distorts the behaviour of firms. Nominal wage contracts are negotiated
before policies are set and hold fixed for one period. The labour market is competitive and the
individuals seek to predict inflation expectations correctly. The aggregate supply of the economy
is, then, given by a modified supply curve:
xt = a(pit − pi
e
t )− bτt (1)
where xt is the (log) output gap, and pit, pi
e
t are inflation and expected inflation respectively. a
shows the ex ante unit impact of unanticipated monetary policy, and b the degree of distortionary
taxation. In this simple model, we abstract from monopoly power is both goods and labour
markets, since as Alesina and Tabellini (1987) show, distortionary taxation alone is responsible
5Our framework is based on a simple reduced-form model allowing us to derive and compare analytically policy
outcomes under different institutional settings and systematic policy biases.
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for the time inconsistent behaviour of policymaking. This simplification allows us to concentrate
on the strategic interaction among the two ‘big’ players, the fiscal and monetary authorities.
The private sector’s market-determined output gap is distorted by taxation, xt = −bτt.
2.2 Fiscal Authority
The government provides public goods and services, having at its disposal taxation and/or
borrowing.6 The government’s objective function is given by an augmented but otherwise con-
ventional loss function. Benigno and Woodford (2004) justify this widely assumed specification
by showing that, in a New-Keynesian framework, an approximation to the household’s utility
can match the loss function, given that the weights on inflation and output gap are appropriately
set.
Ug = −
1
2
2∑
t=1
βt−1ut = −
1
2
2∑
t=1
βt−1
[
(pit − p˜i)
2 + λ1(xt − x˜)
2 + λ2(gt − g
∗)2
]
(2)
The objective function comprises of three arguments
(i) Inflation deviations from its bliss target, p˜i. Despite the benefits of inflation on government
revenues (seigniorage), the bliss inflation target corresponds to price stability, so p˜i = 0.
(ii) Output gap deviations from its bliss target, x˜. The bliss output gap level is defined as
the one that would prevail as a rational expectations equilibrium in the absence of any
(tax or non-tax) distortions. With non-distortionary (i.e. lump-sum) taxes, this translates
into x˜ = 0. The difference among the output goals of the private sector (−bτt) and the
government (0) is the source of the time-inconsistency problem.
(iii) Government spending deviations from its bliss target, g∗ ∈ (0, 1). The bliss spending
target, g∗, is the optimal share of non-distortionary output to be allocated on public
goods, if lump-sum taxes were available. Alternatively, it could also reflect re-election or
interest group motives.
Thus, ut = pi
2
t + λ1x
2
t + λ2(gt − g
∗)2 is the instantaneous loss function and λi > 0, for i = 1, 2
correspond to the weights relative to inflation the government puts on output and government
spending gaps respectively.
The government budget constraint in nominal terms is given by:
PtGt = φτtPtYt +Mt −Mt−1 + PtDt − (1 + ρ)PtDt−1
where Yt, Dt, ρ and τt denote real output, debt, interest and tax rates, respectively. Debt is
indexed, matures after one period and no borrowing can take place in period two.7 Following
Huang and Wei (2006), 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 captures the degree of bureaucratic corruption in the tax
collection mechanism and φτtPtYt is the effective tax revenue base. When φ = 0 the whole
revenue base is ‘eaten up’ and when φ = 1 there is no corruption and all tax revenues accrue to
6The same key implications presented below (Propositions 1-4) can be drawn if we assume that part of gov-
ernment expenditure adds to the productive capacity of the economy. This extension is available from the
Supplementary Material to the paper available from the author.
7Debt indexation excludes the use of surprise inflation in reducing the real value of outstanding debt. See
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997b) for an analysis that includes this incentive.
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the Treasury. There is a strand of the literature (initiated by Leff (1964)) that conceptualises
corruption as the ‘helping hand’ in improving rigid regulation and red tape. Here, we model a
very specific form of bureaucratic corruption that focuses on the tax collection mechanism. Bu-
reaucratic corruption, as in Blackburn et al. (2008) or Ghosh and Neanidis (2010), is captured in
the simple form of embezzlement of public funds. Corrupt bureaucrats either grab tax revenues
or artificially inflate the costs of tax collection. Within our macro-game model, we are predomi-
nantly interested in the impact of existing corruption on monetary and fiscal interactions. Thus,
without explicitly modeling bureaucratic corruption, we account for its effects on limiting tax
revenues. Indeed, there is ample empirical evidence on the constraints corruption imposes on
tax revenues and the government budget. Tanzi and Davoodi (2001) provide evidence on the
negative association between corruption and collection of tax revenues, as well as composition
of taxation, for a large sample of about 90 countries, while Ghura (1998) and Imam and Jacobs
(2007) concentrate on Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, respectively.8
In real terms the budget reads9
gt = pit + φτt + dt − (1 + ρ)dt−1 for t = 1, 2 (3)
where gt, dt, dt−1 are expressed as shares of a non-distortionary level output.
2.3 Monetary Authority
The central bank is responsible for monetary policy and controls inflation perfectly. The mon-
etary authority is subject to time-inconsistency problems, since from equation (1) it can use
surprise inflation to stimulate output, which is considered ‘too low’ due to distortionary taxa-
tion. The objective function of the central bank shares the same arguments and goals as the
government.
V cb = −
1
2
2∑
t=1
βt−1vt = −
1
2
2∑
t=1
βt−1[(pit − p˜i)
2 + ξ1(xt − x˜)
2 + ξ2(gt − g
∗)2] (4)
where p˜i = x˜ = 0 and ξi > 0 for i = 1, 2 represent the central bank’s relative weights on output
and spending gaps.
With ξi = λi, i = 1, 2 a centralised authority (government) is responsible for both monetary
and fiscal policies. Under this setting, the policymaker faces the optimal policy mix and there
is no disagreement regarding the conflicting objectives. In the case where ξi < λi for i = 1, 2
monetary policy is delegated to a weight-conservative (Rogoff-type) central bank that is more
inflation averse relative to the government. With the explicit incorporation of fiscal policy, ξ2
represents the degree of fiscal independence and thus the extent to which the appointed central
bank takes fiscal considerations into account when setting inflation. The case where ξ2 = 0 may
be interpreted as the appointment of a purely independent central bank.
8Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Ziodo-Lobaton (2000) also suggest a negative relationship between cor-
ruption and tax revenues, as the former induces firms to go ‘underground’, which in turn erodes the tax base.
9Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997a) provide a derivation.
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3 Regimes
As standard in the literature, we start our analysis from the second best (commitment) regime,
since it serves as the basis of comparison for different institutional settings. However, with no
available policy pre-commitment only the discretionary regime is feasible. Finally, the core of our
theoretical findings lie in exploring improvements upon the discretionary outcome when fiscal
and monetary policies are decentralised and the latter delegated to a weight-conservative and/or
independent central bank. The focus here is on the role and interplay between bureaucratic
corruption and debt dynamics.
3.1 Second Best
The infeasible first best outcome would result in all policy targets being met, as there are
no distortions in the economy. Taxes and debt, since both non-distortionary, can be used
interchangeably. The second best (SB) outcome of the model is derived from a centralised
authority that is able to commit in the presence of distortionary taxes. Under the commitment
outcome, the centralised authority maximises its intertemporal objective function with respect
to all policy variables at the beginning of period one.
max
τt,pit,dt
= −
1
2
2∑
t=1
ut = −
1
2
2∑
t=1
βt−1
[
pi2t + λ1x
2
t + λ2(gt − g
∗)2
]
Subject to piet = pit for t = 1, 2
xt = −bτt
gt − g
∗ = pit + φτt + dt − Ft; where Ft = (1 + ρ)dt−1 + g
∗
Solving this gives all first and second period policies and outcomes as a function of the
structural parameters of the model, z = {a, b, φ, λ1, λ2, g
∗} as can be seen in Appendix A.1.
Both Alesina and Tabellini’s (1987) (φ = 1) and Huang and Wei’s (2006) (φ < 1) models are
nested as special static cases of our framework.
Optimal debt issuance under the second best institutional arrangement, dSB1 , is independent
of all structural parameters of the model and driven solely from society’s degree of impatience
(1/β) relative to the rate of return to assets, (1 + ρ), and past debt.
dSB1 =
(1 + ρ)d0 + (1− β(1 + ρ))g
∗
1 + β(1 + ρ)2
. (5)
Most importantly, bureaucratic corruption is not affecting the amount of borrowing under the
commitment regime. Although debt impacts both first and second period policies, by real-
locating the burden of raising revenues across time, it cannot affect future expectations. At
the same time, the size of φ is only affecting the shares of seigniorage and taxes in meeting the
government’s financial requirement in each period, not the intertemporal allocation of the two.10
All other policy variables, however, depend on the prevailing level of fiscal corruption. The
10If corruption were time-variant, then optimal debt would depend on φt, see for example Dimakou (2013).
However, in this two period model we assume that φ is time-invariant reflecting that corruption levels change
very sluggishly over time.
7
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
effect of corruption on taxation is non-monotonic. There is a critical level of corruption above
which the centralised authority shifts away from taxation. That is, when the incidence of
corruption is relatively severe, a further leakage in tax revenues makes the collection of more
taxes unwarranted in terms of foregone output. Second best inflation is negatively related to
the degree of corruption; higher bureaucratic corruption always erodes the effective tax revenue
base (φτSB), requiring greater reliance on inflation tax revenues. Finally, a higher scale of
bureaucratic corruption unambiguously results in lower government spending and lower overall
social welfare.11
3.2 Centralised Economic Policy without Commitment
When the centralised authority is unable to pre-commit, policy decisions are made sequentially
and monetary policymaking is subject to the well-known time-inconsistency problem. We pro-
ceed to analyse the discretionary regime, verifying, apart from the standard inflationary bias, all
other policy biases that arise relative to commitment within a dynamic model with an explicit
fiscal authority that suffers from bureaucratic corruption. The model is solved backwards. In
period two the centralised authority sets fiscal and monetary policies according to
max
τ2,pi2
−
1
2
u2 = −
1
2
[
pi22 + λ1x
2
2 + λ2(g2 − g
∗)2
]
Subject to: x2 = a(pi2 − pi
e
2)− bτ2
g2 − g
∗ = pi2 + φ2τ2 − F2 ; where F2 = (1 + ρ)d1 + g
∗
with pie2, d1 given.
Subsequently individual agents form their expectations and period two finishes. In period one,
the government chooses its policy instruments taking people’s expectations and optimal period
two policies as given.
max
τ1,pi1,d1
U = −
1
2
[
u1 + βu
∗,DIS
2 (d1; z)
]
= −
1
2
[
pi21 + λ1x
2
1 + λ2(g1 − g
∗)2 + βu∗,DIS2 (d1; z)
]
Subject to: x1 = a(pi1 − pi
e
1)− b(φ)τ1 with pi
e
1 given
g1 − g
∗ = pi1 + φ1τ1 + d1 − (F1 − d1) ; where F1 = (1 + ρ)d0 + g
∗
Individuals form their first period expectations based on these policy decisions, and period 1
ends. Optimal discretionary debt depends on society’s time preference (1/β) relative to not only
the rate of returns on assets (1 + ρ) but also intratemporal forces, as reflected in K below.
dDIS1 =
(1 + ρ)d0 + (1− β(1 + ρ)K)g
∗
1 + β(1 + ρ)2K
, where K =
[b+ aφ]2λ1λ2 + φ
2λ2 + b
2λ1
b[b+ aφ]λ1λ2 + φ2λ2 + b2λ1
> 1 ∀ φ.
Under discretion, the effective discount factor (β(1+ρ)K) is greater relative to commitment
(β(1 + ρ)). Thus, the centralised authority issues less debt, dDIS1 < d
SB
1 . The observed disac-
cumulation of discretionary debt stems from intratemporal biases and the inability to commit
or what Beetsma and Bovenberg term the credibility effect.12 In a static setting, discretion
11For more details, refer to the Supplementary Material to the paper.
12See for example Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997a), but also Jensen (1994).
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results in both the well-known inflation bias (Barro and Gordon (1983)) and an ‘under-tax bias’
due to active fiscal policy (Alesina and Tabellini, 1987). In addition, the inflation bias is now
endogenous, directly related to the amount of taxation. Thus, the government is collecting
too much revenue in the form of inflation and too little in the form of taxation. Notice that
the government also overspends relative to the commitment outcome.13 In a dynamic setting,
discretionary debt can affect these intratemporal imbalances. The government has the incen-
tive to disaccumulate debt (relative to commitment) to gain on second period credibility, by
constraining second period inflation expectations and ultimately inflation. While responding to
these intratemporal forces, discretionary policies result in both intratemporal and intertemporal
imbalances compared to the second best.
Under a discretionary institutional setting all policy decisions and outcomes depend on the
level of bureaucratic corruption non-monotonically. At an intratemporal level, while the impact
of corruption on taxation follows the same non-linear pattern as in the second best, this is not the
case for inflation. Discretionary inflation is driven by an additional force, namely the endogenous
source of the inflation bias ( abλ1
1+λ2
τDIS). At higher corruption levels, this source is lowered (as the
government moves away from taxation) and that may drive discretionary inflation down.14 In
the same vein, the impact of corruption on discretionary debt, and hence on the degree of debt
disaccumulation relative to commitment, will depend on the response of intratemporal biases,
as reflected in the sensitivity of the credibility effect (∂K/∂φ).
∂dDIS1
∂φ
=
∂dDIS1
∂K
∂K
∂φ
where
∂dDIS1
∂K
< 0 ∀φ
For a2λ1 > 1,
∂K
∂φ
> 0 implying that more corruption weakens the credibility effect and the
degree of debt disaccumulation. Whenever a2λ1 < 1, there is a critical value of φ above which,
more corruption strengthens the credibility effect. In other words, in most cases, higher institu-
tional quality translates into higher debt disaccumulation; albeit this result may be overstated
since reputational issues and private sector’s strategic behaviour are ignored. However, when
the structural parameters are such that the ex ante impact of surprise monetary policy is small
(low a) or the government is quite inflation averse (low λ1), then the intratemporal biases are
not so big, and at low corruption discretionary debt gets closer to the commitment one.
3.3 Decentralisation of monetary policy: Central Bank Independence
Given the intra and intertemporal biases that arise under the discretionary regime, we now
analyse the improvements that can be achieved by delegating monetary policy to a more con-
servative central bank a` la Rogoff (1985). Under this institutional design monetary policy is
delegated to a central bank that attaches lower weights on the output and government spending
arguments relative to inflation (i.e. ξi < λi, i = 1, 2). A lower ξ1 implies the central bank is
more inflation averse relative to output or, in other words, it represents the primacy of price
stability. A lower ξ2 implies that monetary policy making is less considerate of fiscal budgetary
13This is what Adam and Billi (2014) call a ‘government spending bias’.
14Detailed exposition can be found on the Supplementary Material to the paper available from the author. See
also discussion in Huang and Wei (2006) p. 244-245.
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requirements.15 Indeed, central bank reforms towards increased autonomy, in both dimensions,
have been undertaken in many countries in the past couple of decades.
In particular, one of the most important provisions in central bank reforms is the ultimate
prohibition of debt monetisation and direct credit to the government. This translates into a
purely independent central bank, ξ2 = 0. A vast amount of work on both the optimality of
central bank independence (with exogenous or passive fiscal policy), the formulation of a such
a regime and its implications empirically has developed, although empirical findings are still
mixed. We now proceed to analyse the main policy outcomes under this institutional setting,
which form the core of our empirical analysis in the following section.
Central bank independence (CBI) implies that the monetary authority is not fiscally dom-
inated, achieving its monetary target without taking the government’s budgetary needs into
account. The solution to the CBI regime is obtained backwards and summarised in Appendix
A.2. In the second period, the government and the central bank maximise their objective func-
tions with respect to τ2 and pi2 respectively,
maxτ2 u2 = −
1
2
[
pi22 + λ1x
2
2 + λ2(g2 − g
∗)2
]
and maxpi2 v2 = −
1
2
[
pi22 + ξ1x
2
2
]
Subject to x2 = a(pi2 − pi
e
2)− bτ2 ;
g2 − g
∗ = pi2 + φτ2 − F2 ; F2 = (1 + ρ)d1 + g
∗ and d1, pi
e
2 given.
Subsequently, second period expectations are formed and optimal policies obtained. Simi-
larly, in the first period the fiscal and monetary authorities maximise their objective functions
respectively, taking first period inflation expectations and optimal second period policies as
given. Note that only the fiscal authority can affect second period expectations and policy
outcomes (through d1). Debt policy under this regime is given by
dICB1 =
(1 + ρ)d0 + (1− β(1 + ρ)N)g
∗
1 + β(1 + ρ)2N
(6)
where N =
(abξ1λ2φ)
2 + b2λ1λ2(φ
2λ2 + b
2λ1)
b2λ1λ2[abξ1λ2φ+ φ2λ2 + b2λ1]
.
The optimal delegation parameter on inflation aversion is derived by maximising society’s
optimal (with respect to policy decisions) welfare under decentralisation, maxξ1 −
1
2
[u∗,ICB1 (ξ1; z)+
βu∗,ICB2 (ξ1; z)], which yields the following optimality condition
ξopt1 =
b
a
1
φ
λ1. (7)
The size of ξopt1 depends positively on the degree of distortionary taxation (b), the government’s
weight on output gap (λ1), the level of corruption (1/φ) and negatively on the ex ante output
boost channel (a). It will be greater than λ1 whenever b ≥ a or b > aφ, φ <
b
a
. That is, except
for potentially very low levels of corruption (φ > b
a
, if a > b), the commitment outcome can
only be attained with a less conservative than society central bank.16 A budgetary independent
15Within the literature with explicit fiscal policy (e.g. Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2008)), ξ1 corresponds to the
degree of conservativeness of the central bank and ξ2 to the degree of independence.
16When a = b as in Alesina and Tabellini (1987) or Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997a), ξ1 > λ1 ∀φ < 1. The same
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central bank is ignoring not only the government’s financial requirements, but also the capability
of the tax-collection mechanism. In other words, it is not taking into account that a lower φ
implies a more costly tax system, with negative spillovers on both government’s spending and
output gaps, and a higher reliance on inflation tax from the perspective of the government.
Hence, with the explicit incorporation of fiscal policy the optimal institutional design may
be ‘altered’. In the presence of bureaucratic corruption, the trade-off between conservatism and
independence entails a purely independent central bank should be less inflation averse. However,
this is rarely observed in practice and never prescribed in policy/ academic circles. As part of
universally promoted central bank reforms, the primacy of price stability and commitment to
inflation averse functioning are top in the agenda. The appointment, hence, of such a less
conservative central bank may not be feasible for political or credibility reasons. Hence, ξ1 will
be bounded in the proximity of λ1.
Whenever an independent central bank with ξ2 = 0and ξ1 ≤
b
aφ
λ1 is legislatively constituted,
a new aspect emerges in a dynamic environment. The government faces the incentive to use
debt strategically to influence second period monetary setting. This gives rise to the proposition
below.
Proposition 1. For ξ1 <
b
aφ
λ1 delegation of monetary policy to a purely independent central
bank results in higher debt relative to both commitment and discretionary settings. Thus, dICB1 >
dSB1 > d
DIS
1 .
Proof
Suffice to compare the effective discount factors under the three regimes, since they determine
the intertemporal cost of servicing debt. The effective discount factor of the government under
CBI, β(1 + ρ)N , is smaller compared to the second best (β(1 + ρ)) since,
N =
[abξ1λ2φ]
2 + b2λ1λ2(φ
2λ2 + b
2λ1)
b2λ1λ2 [abξ1λ2φ+ φ2λ2 + b2λ1]
< 1, when ξ1 <
b
aφ
λ1
Thus, the government intertemporally shifts its financial requirements away from the first and
towards the second period, by issuing more debt. Similarly, under CBI the effective discount
factor is even lower relative to discretion’s, β(1 + ρ)K, since K > 1 (see section 3.2).

With central bank independence more debt is accumulated relative to both the commitment
and the discretionary regimes, for a given level of bureaucratic corruption. Despite independence,
the government uses debt policy in order to affect second period inflation because monetary pol-
icy is considered too conservative from the ex ante perspective of the government, delivering too
little inflation in both periods. More precisely, the government strategically accumulates debt
so as to increase second period taxes, which in turn distort output further and hence induce the
central bank to increase second period inflation. The channel through which the strategic effect
of debt affects second period inflation is indirectly via the independent central bank’s consider-
ation for period two output gap (ξ1) and it is different from the discretionary case (ξ2 = λ2),
holds in an extension to the model where the government provides public goods that directly enhance private
output in equation (1). See Supplementary Material to the paper available from the author.
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where d1 affects pi
e
2 (and hence pi2) directly, presented in Section 3.2. The strategic debt accumu-
lation proposition can provide an explanation for the mixed results regarding the effectiveness
of central bank independence on inflation performance, particularly among developing countries
or emerging economies. Strategic borrowing may also generate adverse effects on both output
and spending gaps due to higher taxation and a bigger debt burden, worsened by corruption.
Strategic use of debt (positive or negative) can arise under different frameworks, as in Beetsma
and Bovenberg (1997a) or Cabral and Ozkan (2008), that abstract from fiscal corruption. In the
former, this can be due to political distortions (myopic or opportunistic governments, whereby
β, λi differ from society’s). In both works, the result depends on a velocity of money term
(kpit - seigniorage). Here, we look explicitly at a structural institutional distortion on the fiscal
capacity to tax, which in turn produces the need for further seigniorage. Most importantly, we
elaborate on the impact that different levels of corruption (φ) and price stability primacy (ξ1)
have on the debt process. This yields the following three propositions, which are then tested
empirically.
Proposition 2. For values of ξ1 in the range ξ˜1 < ξ1 <
b
aφ
λ1 and given φ, a bigger reform
towards price stability (lower ξ1) induces the government to strategically accumulate more debt.
The opposite occurs when ξ1 < ξ˜1.
Proof
See Appendix A.3 for the proof and analytic definition for ξ˜1.

For relatively moderate values of ξ1 ∈ (ξ˜1,
b
aφ
λ1), increasing the degree of the central banks’s
inflation aversion decreases the effective discount factor. Thus, a bigger reform towards price
stability induces the government to strategically borrow more. The cost of increased borrowing
is lower than the benefit of higher future inflation, as the central bank cares enough about
output distortions so as to respond by delivering higher future inflation. The opposite occurs
for relatively small values of ξ1 ∈ (0, ξ˜1). In this case the government knows that the delegated
central bank (being very inflation averse) will barely raise inflation in response to higher debt
repayment in the second period and refrains from issuing debt.17
Proposition 3. For values of φ in the range φ˜ < φ < 1 and given ξ1 <
b
aφ
λ1, more bureaucratic
corruption induces the government to accumulate more debt. The opposite holds for φ < φ˜.
Proof
See Appendix A.3 for the proof and analytic definition of φ˜.

For corruption levels in the range φ > φ˜, more fiscal corruption reduces the effective discount
factor and increases borrowing. Within this range, more corruption implies a very restrictive
monetary policy and the strategic debt accumulation channel is boosted, in an attempt to
increase future inflation. This result suggests we would expect economies with higher levels of
bureaucratic corruption to exhibit increasing and higher public debt levels with the introduction
17In the extreme case where ξ1 → 0 the central bank operates as an ‘inflation nutter’ and the strategic debt
mechanism vanishes.
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of central bank independence, compared to economies that have better fiscal institutions. For
relatively severe values of corruption, φ ∈ (0, φ˜), a further reduction in φ does not induce the
government to accumulate borrowing. A lower φ is making the tax-system overly inefficient
such that overall revenues get smaller due to the negative impact of tax revenues. Consequently,
the potential mechanism the government has in affecting second period monetary policy gets
prohibitively costly.
Proposition 4. For values of (ξ1, φ) such that
∂N
∂ξ1
> 0, it holds that ∂N
2
∂ξ1∂φ
> 0. Thus, as φ (ξ1)
decreases the impact of ξ1 (φ) on debt accumulation is enhanced.
Proof
See Appendix A.3 for the proof.

The last proposition stresses the interactions among the size of the reform and fiscal in-
efficiencies and the possibility of non-linearities. Concentrating on values of (ξ1, φ) such that
∂N
∂ξ1
> 0, as the degree of inflation aversion of the central bank is increased, the impact of cor-
ruption on debt accumulation is strengthened. That is, the negative effect of corruption on debt
accumulation is higher, when the monetary reform towards price stability is higher. Similarly,
when corruption is higher, the impact of a more conservative central bank on debt is stronger.
Note that Acemoglu et al. (2008) develop a simplified politics redistribution model to ex-
plain under what conditions a central bank reform will succeed in reducing inflation, while also
affecting other policy dimensions (‘seesaw’ effect). Although both contributions highlight the
importance of institutional factors, the mechanisms and results are different. In their approach,
inflation and government expenditure are viewed as redistributions to interest groups and the
extent of their prevalence depends on the degree of control on politicians. They suggest that
at high levels of checks and balances, the political equilibrium will entail a non-distortionary
outcome (low inflation) irrespective of reform, while at high levels of politicians’ unaccountabil-
ity, the distortionary outcome may prevail even if the reform makes it costlier, as politicians
can extract higher ‘transfers’ from the lobby in exchange for higher inflation. Thus, it is at
intermediate levels of constraints to the executive that the reform will be more effective. For
those cases, the success of the monetary reform, may lead to deterioration in fiscal outcomes,
as the lobby can be compensated for the loss of inflation with more government expenditure.
Thus, the source of the inflationary bias is very different from our model, which builds on the
time-inconsistency literature. In the same lines, the mechanisms are distinct. Here, within a
strategic macro game with a newly appointed monetary authority, the government is benevolent,
but attempts to ‘undermine’ the central bank’s effort due to corruption and its subsequent fiscal
leakages. Monetary and fiscal policies interact such fiscal outcomes deteriorate (debt accumula-
tion), decreasing the effectiveness of a central bank reform. Under CBI, more corruption induces
the government to use debt even more in order to stimulate an expansionary monetary policy.
Also, the bigger the reform, the greater the impact that corruption has on the strategic use of
debt. Our framework also points to the direction of ‘inverted’ responses, in that at extreme
levels of corruption or conservativeness, either the tax collection system is not functioning or
the independent central bank is not responding to output distortions (‘inflation nutter’) and
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consequently the strategic debt channel cannot pass through. However, for values of (ξ1, φ)
within plausible and realistic ranges, strategic borrowing succeeds and is negatively affected by
fiscal corruption. We now look at whether these comparative static implications are supported
empirically.
4 Empirical Analysis
Our empirical analysis explores the impact of corruption on fiscal policy (debt accumulation)
given an important reform towards central bank independence. This way, we attempt to provide
an explanation for the poorer inflation performance and the diverse empirical evidence on the
link between central bank independence and inflation for developing and emerging economies.
We follow two main empirical approaches in order to investigate whether a set of our theoretical
predictions are consistent with evidence from the data; an event-study approach in which we
focus only on countries that did undertake legal central bank reforms, and a difference-in-
differences (DID) approach in which we control for countries that did not forego significant
reforms. As a last step, we also provide estimates in a panel data setting.
4.1 Methodology and Data
In our methodology, central bank independence is primarily identified as a point in time, con-
centrating on the timing of an important central bank reform providing a decisive step towards
independence and observe the evolution of debt accumulation from that point onwards compared
to before. Event and DID studies in this area of economic literature have been limited, but are
recently growing.18 Although the timing of a reform is undoubtedly an objective measure of
commitment to more independent monetary policymaking, the magnitude of such reform will
inevitably differ from one country to another. Consequently, we complement our analysis with
a CBI-index that measures the level of independent status each reform gave. Information on
the level of CBI allows us to also carry out a DID estimation, whereby we identify a group of
countries that either did not change their central bank Act or did not enact ‘meaningful’ legal
reforms.
Our first empirical specification associates with the cross-sectional growth models that ex-
amine the existence of “β-convergence” (Barro, 1991). Our empirical investigation involves
estimating the effect of bureaucratic corruption on debt accumulation after an important cen-
tral bank reform in a cross-sectional setting. This is conducted as follows. Denoting τ as that
point in time in which a country had a decisive reform, we calculate the average debt-to-GDP
ratio of three years before and after the reformed date.19
DB =
dτ−3 + dτ−2 + dτ−1
3
and DA =
dτ + dτ+1 + dτ+2
3
where dt = Dt/GDPt corresponds to the debt-to-GDP ratio. If the reform is enacted in the
18For instance, see Ball and Sheridan (2005), Daunfeldt and de Luna (2008), Goncalves and Salles (2008), Lin
and Ye (2009), Brito and Bystedt (2010), Acemoglu et al. (2008), Crowe and Meade (2008) and Hielscher and
Markwardt (2012).
19The choice of three years averaging was merely driven by debt data availability. Although not presented here,
using four and five years averages does not qualitatively affect our results, but increases the number of cases with
missing data, particularly for the pre-reform period.
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first two quarters of year τ , then τ is included in the after period (as shown above). Otherwise,
we start the after period in (τ + 1) to allow for the reform to be fully realised. Based on the
theoretical implication that more corruption leads to more debt accumulation (Proposition 3),
the first empirical specification employed is
GDi = α+ βQUALi + γXi + εi (8)
GD = DA−DB
DB
× 100 is the percentage change in the average three years before and after
debt-to-GDP ratio.
QUAL reflects the level of corruption (quality) of each country and X consists of a set of
control variables (discussed below). Subscript i refers to each observation (country and reform)
in our sample, thus countries with two central bank reforms are treated as different observations.
CBI is implicitly identified as that point around which the dependent variable is centered, and
hence, despite this being a snapshot analysis, there is a time-dimensional element (generated by
DBi). A caveat is in order. Given that GD internalises the adoption of a central bank reform
and that such reforms are not randomly assigned, our estimation results are interpreted as robust
correlations between corruption and debt accumulation, conditional on CBI being granted, and
not as causal effects.
Our second empirical specification follows a DID approach in the spirit of Ball and Sheri-
dan (2005), controlling for countries that did not forego important central bank reforms and
ameliorating on the issue of endogeneity of reforms.
GDi = α+ β1QUALi + β2CBRi + β3QUALi × CBRi + γXi + εi (9)
where CBR takes the value of 1 for those countries that enacted significant legal reforms (to
be defined below), and zero otherwise. Here, we are predominantly interested in the interaction
term, showing the impact that corruption may have on the effectiveness of the reform. Our
approach bears some similarities with the timing approach to CBI within event and DID studies.
The majority of these contributions concentrate on the effect of inflation-targeting (IT) adoption
on inflation, output and/or their volatility and their results are mixed. Ball and Sheridan (2005)
compare the effect of inflation targeting in 20 OECD countries in a cross-sectional difference-
in-difference approach, and find no evidence of improvement in economic performance. For
developing countries, Brito and Bystedt (2010) suggest that inflation targeting has a (negative
but) mild impact on inflation and a negative impact on output growth. Lin and Ye (2009), using
a propensity score matching approach, show that the treatment effect of inflation targeting in
lowering inflation is large and significant, but at the same time they reveal that fiscal discipline
is an important factor that determines the efficiency of inflation targeting.
However, our methodology and conceptualisation differs in many ways. We incorporate a
broader concept of CBI looking at important central bank reforms (not restricted to, but also
including IT). This is also the case for Acemoglu et al. (2008) and Crowe and Meade (2008),
although our sample size is larger. More importantly, the focus here is on debt accumulation,
and hence on the fiscal discipline effect. We first investigate the conditional relation between
debt accumulation and bureaucratic corruption, given an important central bank reform towards
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CBI.20 Acemoglu et al.’s (2008) ‘seesaw’ effect bears some similarities with ours, as they inves-
tigate the impact of reforms on government spending, using a fixed-effects panel analysis and
focusing on the longer-run. They conclude that further investigation is needed. In equation (8)
we focus on the immediate response of debt to the reform in relation to fiscal corruption and
in Section 4.3 fixed-effects panel estimations are undertaken both in the spirit of eq. (8) and in
line with the empirical strategy of Acemoglu et al. (2008). In our DID specification (equation
(9)), extending the IT literature, we control for countries that did not enact important reforms
in their monetary policy making. This allows us to identify whether there is indeed a difference
in debt-to-GDP evolution between control and treatment groups, and whether the constraints
corruption imposes are stronger among the set of countries that significantly reformed their
central banks, unlike Crowe and Meade (2008) and Hielscher and Markwardt (2012) who do not
incorporate a control group.
Country Sample and Data
Our country sample for the event study specification consists of 77 countries, 23 advanced
and 54 developing. In the DID specification the country sample in augmented to include 12
more countries. Central bank reform dates span from 1989 to 2002 and 29 countries had two
reforms during the examined period which raises the number of observations in the model to
106. Developing countries come from all geo-economic regions and provide for a very diverse
sample. Indeed, during the 1990s and beginning of 2000s the majority of central banks around
the world enhanced their autonomous status. Apart from this universal trend towards increased
independence, there is a number of regional and country specific factors that can explain the
observed patterns towards CBI. The importance of creditworthiness, the break from past political
activities and ‘failed’ policies (e.g. in Latin America), crises or collapse of previous institutions
(East Asia, Latin America), aspiration of EU admission (Eastern Europe) constitute a few of
such factors. Using the information from the updated CBI indices, we observe that advanced
economies have attained the highest level of CBI, followed closely by Europe and Central Asia
(ECA) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). In many instances, those two groups
rank higher than non-EU advanced economies, since many countries undertook very ambitious
reforms. Countries in East Asia and Pacific (EAP), Subsaharan Africa (SSA) and Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) regions have substantially lower degrees of CBI. In the last two
groups the reforms are quite recent (beginning of 2000s) and small in magnitude.
Public debt data are taken from Jaimovich and Panizza (2006). Their debt database refers to
central government debt (domestic and external) as a share of GDP. As a proxy for bureaucratic
corruption (QUAL) we use two widely known indices; the Control of Corruption index from the
Worldwide Governance Indicator (CC-WGI) (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2009) and the
the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International (CPI-TI). The CC-WGI index is
available bi-annually since 1996 and annually after 2002. We use the average for the 1996-2005
period for each country, since this is the only available period that is included in the time span
of reforms. For robustness purposes, we also employ individual years of the CC-WGI index, as
well as the CPI-TI as of 2005. Both indices are transformed and range from 0 to 10, increasing
20Al-Marhubi (2000) empirically confirms the adverse impact of corruption on inflation.
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in institutional quality.
Data on central bank reform dates have been collected from official Central Bank websites,
legal databases and various reference papers.21 Inflation Targeting (IT) adoption dates are also
treated as central bank reforms.22 The timing of reforms is complemented by a newly compiled
CBI-index capturing the level of independence each reform gave. This is a highly relevant
distinction, since reforms resulted in quite distinct levels of monetary policy autonomy. We
use the widely used Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) index (thereafter GMT), which
assesses the degree of autonomy based on a set of legal criteria in the Central Bank Act. We
employ updates of the GMT-index from other studies and own calculations.23 The degree of
CBI is introduced in a categorical (dummy) variable format, as shown below. This reduces the
subjectivity biases that arise from the combination of various sources, as some variation in legal
CBI levels could be due to different interpretations of researchers. Additionally, there is evidence
that a dummy variable specification is preferred, without loss in predictive power (Cargill, 2013;
Parkin, 2013).
Our CBI-index variable is grouped into four categories for high, upper medium, lower medium
and low independence. The GMT-index is measured in a 0 (no CBI) to 16 (full CBI) scale, by
adding up its two components (political and economic autonomy). The categorisation of the
countries into the four classes is based on deriving somehow equal sized groups, while keeping
the level of CBI as coherent as possible (Appendix B.1). There is no country with a 0 score (the
least independent is Qatar with a score of 3) nor with 16. More precisely,
IHIGH =
{
1 if CBI ≥ 13
0 otherwise
IUMED =
{
1 if 11 ≤ CBI ≤ 12
0 otherwise
ILMED =
{
1 if 8 ≤ CBI ≤ 10
0 otherwise
ILOW =
{
1 if CBI ≤ 7
0 otherwise.
Based on this information we construct a control (non-reform) group for the difference-in-
differences estimation as follows. All countries with a CBI level less than 9 points are identified as
very small, and hence not meaningful reforms. In addition, we use data from Polillo and Guille´n
(2005) and identify 12 more countries for which the CUK independence index (Cukierman et al.,
1992) did not change throughout 1990s.
The control variables in vector X are depicted in Table 1. Variations in GDP (GRGDP )
could be affecting the dependent variable (as a share of GDP) negatively, while the impact of
variations in inflation (INF ) is unclear. Some countries have indexed debt, though for others
with non-indexed debt we would expect variations in inflation to affect debt negatively. Further,
we control for the exchange rate regime of each country, since the more rigid the system, the
less scope for discretionary monetary policy. Financial or currency crises are also accounted
for, as they can have sizeable effects on debt accumulation. For instance, the Asian financial
crisis of 1997 caused Indonesia’s debt-to-GDP to increase by 235% between 1997-1998. The
crisis dummy (CRISIS i) captures all the major crises that occurred during the 1990s and the
beginning of 2000s. HIGHDB controls for those countries that are highly indebted before the
21Indicatively, Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto (2006), Maliszewski (2000), Ja´come and Va´zquez (2005), Roger
and Stone (2005) and Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti (2002).
22IT adoption represents a highly credible and ‘non-reversible’ regime shift (Samarina and Sturm, 2014).
23See Dimakou (2010) for details on sources, reformed Central Bank Acts, dates and the GMT-index scores.
17
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Table 1: Control Variables
Variable Description Source
GRGDP Percentage change of annual average real GDP between
three years before and after the reform. In the panel es-
timations we use real GDP per capita data
PWT8.0
INF Percentage change of annual average Consumer Price Index
(CPI) between three years before and after the reform
IFS - IMF
EXj De facto classification of regimes into fixed (EXFIX), in-
termediate (EXINTER) and floating (EXFLOAT )
Bubula and O¨tker Robe (2002)
CRISIS Dummy variable that takes value 1 for those countries that
experienced a financial or currency crises during the years
of interest; 0 otherwise. In panel regressions we also employ
a debt restructuring (DEBTRESTR) dummy variable.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008),
Valencia and Laeven (2008)
HIGHDB Dummy variable that takes value 1 for those countries that
average debt-to-GDP ratio before the reform exceeds 80%;
0 otherwise
HIPC Dummy variable that takes value 1 for those countries that
had their decision or completion points under the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)-initiative included in the
period examined
www.worldbank.org/hipc
PRES,PAR Dummy variables identifying whether the political system
in each country is presidential or parliamentary (relative to
assembly-elected president),
DPI - World Bank
DSY S and whether there was a change in the system during the
reform period
FRAC Degree of fractionalisation in the legislature (probability
that two legislators selected at random are from the same
party)
DPI - WB
POLAR Degree of political polarisation (difference among the ideo-
logical position of the government and opposition)
DPI - WB
LIEC Legislative index of electoral competition DPI -WB
See Table B.2 in the Appendix for country classification in each control dummy. Summary statistics
are provided from the Supplementary Material to the paper available from the author.
reform. Countries with excessive debt-to-GDP ratios face a set of different challenges. Due
to credit or other constraints, they might not be able to issue more debt, but at the same
time it could be difficult to implement a drastic debt disaccumulation policy. Overall, countries
with high starting debt/GDP levels experienced small decreases after the reforms. A similar
control variable accounts for the HIPC-initiatives, initiated in 1996 and further enhanced in
1999 by the WB and IMF, as schemes of debt relief for poor countries. Finally, we control
for a set of political economy variables that could be responsible for cross-country variation in
debt evolution. Using data from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001), we
first account for the type and differences in the political system; presidential, parliamentary
and assembly-elected president. The last category is associated with a lower level of democracy
and elections competitiveness. We also control for the degree of fractionalisation and political
polarisation. Various political economy theories suggest that parliamentary systems, and more
fragmented and polarised legislatures may exhibit increased debt levels. However, note that
these theoretical predictions refer to longer time frames, particularly among democracies and
focus on debt-to-GDP levels (rather than short period growth rates).
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4.2 Estimation Results
Table 2 presents the estimation results for equation (8). Overall, the effect of QUAL is significant
at the 1% level and ranges between 3.6 and 5.6%. This implies that a decrease in institutional
quality (more corruption) is associated with an increase in the rate of growth of (3-years average)
debt-to-GDP ratio of approximately four percentage points. Given that average GD in our
sample is 10.1%, the impact of corruption on debt accumulation is sizeable.
Table 2: Estimation Results for equation (8) (No. of observations 106)
(1) (2) (3) (4)† (5)† (6)‡
Const. 45.928 44.708 51.310 42.758 41.869 54.215
(4.637)*** (4.266)*** (5.041)*** (4.585)*** (4.492)*** (3.045)***
QUAL -4.170 -4.656 -3.846 -3.798 -3.579 -5.601
(-3.473)*** (-3.411)*** (-3.340)*** (-3.331)*** (-3.168)*** (-3.094)
GRGDP -0.816 -0.837 -0.832 -0.744 -0.803 -1.160
(-2.218)** (-2.137)** (-2.211)** (-2.088)** (-2.212)** (-4.084)***
INF -0.122 -0.118 -0.110 -0.127 -0.126 -0.032
(-5.093)*** (-4.540)*** (-4.646)*** (-8.208)*** (-7.940)*** (-0.436)
HIGHDB -19.152 -18.450 -18.204 -17.818 -21.609
(-3.899)*** (-3.393)*** (-3.810)*** (-3.789)*** (-4.134)***
CRISIS 42.573 40.886 40.716 35.942 32.962 35.952
(4.905)*** (5.083)*** (4.576)*** (4.547)*** (4.235)*** (4.107)***
HIPC -10.202 -12.287 -8.442 -10.174 -9.421 -3.297
(-1.197) (-1.410) (-0.935) (-1.210) (-1.118) (-0.351)
DB -0.196
(-2.678)***
EXINTER 0.658
(0.108)
EXFLOAT 8.696
(1.458)
PRES -16.986
(-1.217)
PAR 0.663
(0.045)
DSYS -12.636
(-0.846)
FRAC 19.263
(1.259)
POLAR -3.919
(-1.009)
R-square 0.487 0.502 0.487 0.569 0.587 0.547
Adj. R-square 0.456 0.461 0.456 0.533 0.549 0.490
SER 24.358 24.249 24.362 22.570 22.195 22.989
F-stat (p) 15.683 (0.00) 12.228 (0.00) 12.228 (0.00) 15.986 (0.00) 15.173 (0.00) 9.751 (0.00)
Note: OLS estimation with Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance. t-ratios in paren-
theses; * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1% levels of significance. † In columns (4) and (5) we control for three
outlier countries. Although not reported, the dummy variables for Turkey, Indonesia and Kyrgyz are high
significant. ‡ In column (6), due to unavailability of polarisation data, the sample size reduces to 101.
GRGDP and INF have a negative impact on GD, albeit quantitatively small, while exchange
rate regimes are found to be insignificant (Column (2)). The HIPC dummy variable is negative,
but insignificant in most specifications. HIGHDB, CRISIS are always significant both statisti-
cally and quantitatively. Their sizeable effects are attributable to the inclusion of countries with
very different debt processes compared to the average. In most countries hit by a crisis, there
were marked increases in their debt-to-GDP ratios; in others where GD was not largely affected
the impact of the crisis is noticed in either their GDP growth or inflation. Highly indebted
countries are experiencing debt decreases after the reforms.
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In column (3) we follow the growth Barro-type specification more closely using the ‘initial’
debt-to-GDP ratio as one of the regressors. The impact of the before the reform debt-to-
GDP is significant and the importance of institutional quality prevails. In columns (4) and
(5) we control for some outlier countries, as a means of confirming that the results are not
driven by exceptional cases. These are: Indonesia and Turkey that show their debt-to-GDP
ratios increase substantially in the midst of their financial crises; and Kyrgyz Republic (1997)
that also experienced a big increase in GD due to the negative spill-over of the Russian crisis.
Results remain robust with the impact of QUAL in the same range as before. In column (6) we
control for political factors, which are however found to be insignificant.
Results in Table 2 are consistent with the main statement of Proposition 3; more corruption
is associated with higher debt-to-GDP accumulation given a reform. However, our proposition
also suggests that at severe levels of corruption, the strategic effect of debt might get ‘reversed’.
We check this by adding an interaction term (QUAL × LOWQUAL), but find little support for
the ‘reversal’.24 This might imply that either our sample does not contain countries with such
characteristics, or the impact is not easily identified because we neglected the size of the reform.
Results for different levels of Central Bank Independence
Our empirical investigation in equation (8) does not account for the level of independence that
may well differ from one reform to another. Our comparative-static predictions (indicated by
Proposition 4) suggest that we would expect the effect of fiscal institutional quality to be stronger
when high levels of CBI are legislated, rather than when a monetary policy regime shift is only
limited. We account for this feature empirically by interacting corruption with a CBI-dummy
variable, reflecting the level of independence the central bank reform in question gave. This
proposition is further explored in a DID estimation. Note that Crowe and Meade (2008), using
updated data for the CUK CBI-index25 for 56 countries, formulate a first difference specification
in which the difference in inflation is explained by the difference in this de jure measure of
independence. However, the timing of each reform in question is ignored, as all countries are
grouped into the initial (1987-91) and the current (2002-06) periods. Here, due to unavailability
of data we incorporate only the level of the CBI after the reform, but we do account for the
timing. Results for the following regression are presented in Table 3.
GDi = α+
4∑
k=1
βkCBIkiQUALi + γXi + εi (10)
where CBIk, k = 1, ..., 4 stands for the four (high, upper and lower medium, low) categories of
independence levels.
Our empirical results provide evidence of a non-linear effect of corruption on GD. The
impact of institutional quality on debt-to-GDP accumulation is the highest for the countries
that shifted to very high levels of CBI, and gradually decreases as the level of CBI introduced
24LOWQUAL takes value 1 for countries with very low quality scores. When the cutoff point is set very low,
the coefficient of the interaction term is positive, as we expect, but highly insignificant. Results do not improve
if we include more countries in the dummy, increasing the cutoff point.
25The CUK index was initially constructed using Acts in effect as of 1991. Crowe and Meade (2008) update
the data looking at current central bank Acts as of 2003.
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by the reform lessens. The interaction variables of quality with high, upper medium and low
CBI are significant under all specifications. According to Table 3 (column (1)), within the
reforms that resulted in a high degree of independence, a unit rise in corruption (lower QUAL)
is associated with increases in the debt/GDP ratio of 4.6 percentage points; this is then dropped
to about 4.3 points for the UMED group, and to around 2.9 point for those countries that only
established very limited independence. However, the interaction variable QUAL*ILMED turns
out to be insignificant, and this is further explored in Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.26
The two clusters that incorporate the smallest reforms are quite diverse in terms of both
timing of reforms and geo-economic regions. They also include the majority of low-income
countries, as well as all the Asian crisis-hit and HIPC countries.27 We follow two lines of
investigation. First, we investigate the relative level of independence granted in the two clusters.
The ILMED group is characterised overall by low political autonomy and its main improvements
compared to ILOW come from economic autonomy aspects. Considering that a certain level
of political autonomy is also required for economic autonomy to be more relevant, those two
groups that exhibit lower levels of CBI do not differ systematically. Integrating the two clusters
(column (2)) results in a significant and reform-size ascending relation between corruption and
debt accumulation.
Second, we examine closely the composition of countries in the ILMED group. It is the group
with the lowest standard deviation in institutional quality, driven by the lack of high quality
countries. Within the group, two of the countries with the highest QUAL scores, Australia
(1993) and Malta (1994) experienced sizeable increases in their debt-to-GDP ratios after the
Central Bank reforms, due to severe recessions.28 Controlling for both cases (Column (3)) shows
the effect of institutional quality within the ILMED without them. Column (5) additionally
controls for Nicaragua (1992), Sierra Leone (2000) (both in the ILMED group), as well as
Kyrgyz, Turkey and Indonesia. Finally, we include a set of political variables, which are again
found to be insignificant. Interestingly, their inclusion makes the non-linear impact of corruption
under all four categories stronger both quantitatively and statistically.
The results of Table 3 suggest the presence of non-linearities in the conditional correlation
between bureaucratic corruption and debt at different levels of CBI. In testing the significance
of these non-linearities we perform a set of coefficient restriction tests (Wald test) and factor
breakpoint tests. The results are mixed. In all specifications, the significant difference among
the coefficient of IHIGH and ILOW is confirmed. Further, when Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and
Kyrgyz are excluded, the factor breakpoint tests suggest that the breaks, as identified by the
four independence clusters, are all significant. Finally, we check for the presence of a ‘reversal’
effect, while conditioning for the magnitude of the reform. Our results provide some evidence
for the IUMED group of reforms; at severely low levels of corruption, the strategic debt effect
becomes negative (asset accumulation).29
26This result may also suggest some evidence of a ‘reversal’ in the relationship in question.
27Bolivia is an exception; although classified as HIPC, the magnitude of the 1995 reform was such that it is
placed in the high CBI (IHIGH ) group.
28A widely accepted view in the case of Australia (e.g. Macfarlane (1998) is that the recession was responsible
for the drop of inflation and hence for the success of the IT regime which followed. Also note that both countries
have been identified as outliers when employing the influence statistics techniques.
29The coefficient is positive, albeit insignificant for the IHIGH group as well. Results are available through the
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Table 3: Estimation Results for GD using CBI levels (No. of observations 106)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)† (6)‡
Const. 42.612 43.151 45.357 50.090 39.918 47.803
(4.204)*** (4.320)*** (4.618)*** (4.969)*** (4.305)*** (2.508)**
GRGDP -0.780 -0.793 -0.847 -0.860 -0.805 -1.042
(-2.174)** (-2.210)** (-2.309)** (-2.303)** (-2.260) (-3.557)***
INF -0.121 -0.121 -0.121 -0.110 -0.129 -0.035
(-4.719)*** (-4.735)*** (-4.633)*** (-4.247)*** (-8.244)*** (-0.490)
HIGHDB -21.190 -21.345 -19.975 -19.876 -23.731
(-4.143)*** (-4.145)*** (-3.790)*** (-3.901)*** (-4.442)***
CRISIS 43.173 43.277 43.861 42.219 34.667 36.356
(5.015)*** (5.139)*** (5.128)*** (4.788)*** (4.567)*** (4.331)***
HIPC -10.413 -9.897 -9.564 -8.259 -2.936 -5.487
(-1.280) (-1.220) (-1.149) (-0.910) (-0.384) (-0.614)
QUAL*IHIGH -4.600 -4.651 -4.887 -4.540 -4.255 -7.113
(-3.712)*** (-3.837)*** (-4.069)*** (-3.970)*** (-3.697)*** (-3.482)***
QUAL*IUMED -4.310 -4.383 -4.680 -4.218 -3.919 -6.693
(-2.973)*** (-3.082)*** (-3.306)*** (-3.151)*** (-2.964)*** (-3.252)***
QUAL*ILMED -2.470 -3.757 -3.525 -2.853 -4.554
(-1.465) (-2.622)** (-2.494)** (-2.055)** (-2.275)**
QUAL*ILOW -2.980 -3.331 -2.924 -2.535 -4.915
(-2.310)** -2.822571 (-2.678)*** (-2.266)** (-2.142)** (-2.621)**
QUAL*ILMED+
QUAL*ILOW
(-2.183)**
DB -0.192
(-2.477)**
AUS 53.091 48.905 50.142
(6.160)*** (5.310)*** (5.884)***
MLT1 37.154 36.815 35.980
(5.203)*** (5.145)*** (5.113)***
PRES -14.850
(-1.020)
PAR 4.366
(0.280)
DSYS -11.055
(-0.709)
FRAC 22.930
(1.494)
POLAR -0.865
(-0.228)
R-square 0.514 0.513 0.544 0.538 0.659 0.583
Adj. R-square 0.469 0.473 0.491 0.484 0.598 0.515
SER 24.077 23.978 23.566 23.729 20.950 22.437
F-stat (Prob) 11.292 (0.0) 12.782
(0.0)
10.208 (0.0) 9.952 (0.0) 10.752 (0.0) 8.573 (0.0)
Note: OLS estimation with Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance. t-
ratios in parentheses; * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1% levels of significance. †In column (5) the
controls for NIC1, SLE, KGZ, TUR and IDN are all significant, although not reported. ‡Number
of observations in column (6) is 101 due to non-available polarisation data.
Results from difference-in-differences estimation
We now turn to estimate equation (9) and explore proposition 4 within a different empirical
setting. We determine the control (non-reform) group by, first, augmenting our country sample.
According to Polillo and Guille´n (2005), there were 12 countries for which the CUK independence
index did not change during 1990s. Apart from USA and the Bahamas, all other cases are
Supplementary Material.
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developing countries with relatively high corruption incidence.30 In addition, our control group
includes all countries for which the CBI index is lower than or equal to 8. Thus, we identify this
cluster of countries as not granting a significant degree of independence. Indeed, as discussed
above, the majority of these reforms were only partial, providing very limited political autonomy
to the central bank. This way, we have a control group of 46 and a treatment group of 72
countries. We use the average year of reforms among the treatment group (1996) as the start
date for the ‘after’ period of the control group.31
Estimation results are presented in Table 4. Our interest lies on the impact of corruption
of debt, and particularly the interaction term which shows whether corruption has an impact
among the countries that did significant central bank reforms (relative to the ones that did not).
That is,
∂GD
∂QUAL
= βˆ1 + βˆ3CBR, βˆ1, βˆ3 < 0.
Although the direct negative relationship, given by βˆ1, is insignificant, the impact of corruption
on debt accumulation is significant and sizeable for those countries that foregone a meaning-
ful reform towards CBI (coefficient of the interaction term, βˆ3). This finding suggests that
institutional quality constraints fiscal policies particularly when monetary policy is granted in-
dependence. In other words, bureaucratic corruption seems an important factor determining the
effectiveness of central bank reforms. This result is consistent with the findings of Hielscher and
Markwardt (2012), who employing the dataset and methodology of Crowe and Meade (2008),
suggest that the effectiveness of central bank reforms depends on the quality of political insti-
tutions. They do not include a control group, however. In addition, the direct impact of a
meaningful central bank reform increases debt accumulation; the coefficient of CBR is positive
and significant, in line with the predictions of Proposition 1.
However, outliers are present in both in the non-reform and reform groups. In the next two
columns we account for this, and show that results remain unchanged. In column (2) we control
for Turkey, Indonesia and Australia, while in column (3) we exclude all observations for which
residuals were above (below) 2 standard deviations from the regression line.
Another important consideration relates to inflation targeting reforms. Our non-reform
group includes six countries32 that moved to inflation targeting, and despite the fact that their
CBI-index is low (< 8) such a monetary policy shift indicates a strong commitment towards
price stability, independent from fiscal considerations. In column (4) of Table 4 we include
these cases into the reform group and find that the interaction term between corruption and
CBR becomes quantitatively stronger. Finally, in the last two columns, we control for political
factors. Presidential systems exhibit a strong negative effect on debt accumulation, while the
countries that experienced a political system shift also reduced their debt rates. However,
political considerations are not robust and turn insignificant when controlling for outliers.
30In the estimations presented here, we always exclude Congo, DR as it turns out to be a strong outlier (with
a hyperinflation of 2,962 % during the period of interest).
31We select the cut-off point (low GMT index) by trading off between identifying cases where reforms were
small (granting limited autonomy) and generating an adequately sizeable control group. Setting the cut-off point
to 9 or changing the average date of the reforms, is generally producing similar results. See Appendix B.3 and
supplementary material.
32These are: N. Zealand (1990), Norway (2000), Sweden (1995), Israel (1997), S. Africa (2000) and Thailand
(2000). In this specification, our sample size increases to 117 due to S. Africa.
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Table 4: Estimation Results for equation (9)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Const. 25.318 24.942 21.523 19.949 63.127 45.619
(2.090)** (2.076)** (2.345)** (1.593) (3.372)*** (2.309)**
QUAL -1.229 -1.409 -1.382 0.166 -1.126 -0.298
(-0.770) (-0.878) (-1.039) (0.099) (-0.629) (-0.160)
CBR 30.616 26.465 22.496 36.731 37.322 42.473
(2.408)** (2.187)** (2.413)** (2.854)*** (2.815)*** (3.040)***
QUAL*CBR -3.768 -3.338 -3.114 -5.157 -4.445 -5.843
(-1.953)* (-1.838)* (-2.120)** (-2.630)*** (-2.215)** (-2.769)***
GRGDP -0.848 -0.813 -0.921 -0.870 -1.243 -1.195
(-3.225)*** (-3.098)*** (-4.317)*** (-3.395)*** (-5.929)*** (-5.278)***
DB -0.125 -0.101 -0.065 -0.135 -0.142 -0.151
(-2.002)** (-1.709)* (-1.316) (-2.059)** (-2.115)** (-2.133)**
INF -0.111 -0.116 -0.110 -0.114 -0.081 -0.083
(-6.961)*** (-12.113)*** (-11.947)*** (-6.876)*** (-2.280)** (-2.458)**
CRISIS 34.248 28.401 30.242 37.249 24.339 29.024
(4.362)*** (4.154)*** (5.418)*** (4.420)*** (3.464)*** (3.620)***
HIPC -15.068 -15.056 -12.165 -13.988 -7.825 -7.400
(-1.762)* (-1.904)* (-1.791)* (-1.594) (-0.749) (-0.719)
PRES -1.638 4.775
(-0.135) (0.338)
PAR -1.492 -2.265
(-0.440) (-0.611)
DSYS -40.403 -29.926
(-2.901)*** (-2.023)**
FRAC -29.047 -15.548
(-2.012)** (-1.007)
POLAR -39.596 -28.707
(-2.701)*** (-1.878)*
R-square 0.493 0.617 0.652 0.508 0.578 0.568
Adj. R-square 0.455 0.577 0.623 0.471 0.521 0.511
SER 22.865 20.157 14.287 23.273 20.918 21.902
No of Observ. 116 116 103 117 111 112
F-stat 13.024 15.252 22.027 13.834 10.199 9.924
Prob(F-stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: OLS estimation with Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance. t-ratios in
parentheses; * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1% levels of significance. Our original specification has
116 observations, since ongo, DR is dropped and the second reform of S. Africa (IT adoption) is not
applicable. The latter is included in columns (4) and (6), when the six inflation targeters are moved
to the reform group. In column (2), although not reported, the dummies for Turkey, Indonesia and
Australia are highly significant.
4.3 Robustness
A set of different robustness checks has been performed and selected results are displayed in
Table B.3 of Appendix B. We perform the analysis for different model specifications, looking
at both the level and the difference (gross measure for fiscal deficit) of debt-to-GDP ratios;
we also confirm robustness of results when controlling for outliers, excluding observations with
high standardised residuals, and under different sub-samples. Our results are also consistent
when using other years of the CC-WGI corruption measure, as well as the one of Transparency
International. We also try different parameterisations for the control and treatment groups (in
terms of both countries and average reform date for the former group) in the DID estimations.33
We now analyse the robustness of our results employing two different estimation strategies
in a panel data framework. First, we estimate an equivalent of equation (8) using a fixed effect
33All results of robustness tests are available from the author upon request.
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panel analysis with t = 2, for the three-year averages of the pre and post reform dates (Table 5).34
This way we can account for unobserved heterogeneity in our sample (time-invariant omitted
variables) and ameliorate possible endogeneity issues with regards to bureaucratic corruption.
In addition, in these estimations we can assess directly the effect of the central bank reform on
debt.
Table 5: Panel Regressions on log(Debt) - Fixed Effects with t = 1 (pre), 2 (post).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Const. 18.938 18.896 18.548 18.118 18.048 17.753
(4.287)*** (4.233)*** (4.074)*** (4.263)*** (4.179)*** (3.903)***
CBR 0.569 0.581 0.565 0.534 0.545 0.482
(4.744)*** (4.522)*** (4.336)*** (4.453)*** (4.269)*** (0.105)***
CBR*QUAL -0.047 -0.048 -0.047
(-3.631)*** (-3.532)*** (-3.173)***
QUAL 0.017 0.027 0.032 0.023 0.029 -0.028
(0.403) (0.576) (0.573) (0.525) (0.600) (0.051)
Log(RGDP) -1.226 -1.225 -1.203 -1.158 -0.053 -1.308
(-3.285)*** (-3.228)*** (-3.128)*** (-3.220)*** (-3.777)*** (0.395)***
Log(PR) -0.283 -0.292 -0.274 -0.283 -0.043 -0.201
(-2.174)** (-2.207)** (-2.022)** (-2.141)** (-2.738)*** (0.094)**
HIGHDB 0.219 0.221 0.222 0.230 -0.034 0.245
(3.928)*** (3.951)*** (3.859)*** (3.819)*** (-1.987)** (0.060)***
CBR*QUAL*IHIGH -0.052 -0.041 -0.048
(-3.905)*** (-2.862)*** (0.013)***
CBR*QUAL*IUMED -0.042 -1.152 -0.039
(-2.773)*** (-3.139)*** (0.015)***
CBR*QUAL*ILMED -0.032 -0.292 -0.031
(-1.933)* (-2.193)** (0.017)*
CBR*QUAL*ILOW -0.040 0.229 -0.036
(-2.906)*** (3.844)*** (0.014)**
In columns (1) and (4) QUAL takes the CC-WGI value of 1996 for t = 1 and 2002 for t = 2. In columns
(2) and (5) we use CC-WGI of 1998 and 2002 for the two time periods, while in columns (3) and (6) we
use 2000 and 2005.
As can be seen from the first three columns in Table 5, the negative association between
institutional quality and debt when moving towards increased CBI (CBR*QUAL) is confirmed.
We also see that the impact of corruption in the central bank reform - debt nexus is increasing
in the size of the reform (last three columns of Table 5). Both these findings are in line with the
cross-sectional and difference-in-differences estimations of Tables 2 - 4. Furthermore, there is a
positive correlation between the CBR event and debt accumulation. This result is consistent
with Proposition 1 and findings in Table 4; for a given level of corruption, moving towards CBI
increases debt accumulation. The direct impact of corruption is always found to be insignificant.
This can be explained by the quantitatively small and statistically insignificant time variation
in each country’s level of corruption, as depicted by the available over time CC-WGI data.
Second, we follow closely the econometric strategy of Acemoglu et al. (2008), focusing on a
slightly different question, while employing a longer annual panel data model.
logDebtit = ρlogDebtit−1 + γ1HQUALi × CBRit + γ2MQUALi × CBRit
+γ3LQUALi × CBRit +Xit + fi + εit
(11)
34The Hausman test confirms that fixed effects is the preferred specification. Debt is the debt-to-GDP ratio, PR
the consumer price index, CBR takes value 1 in the post-reform period and QUAL is the Control of Corruption
index for various pairwise years.
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where t = 1986−2005 and i = 1, ...89 and we have a highly unbalanced panel. Debt is the debt-to-
GDP ratio, CBR is a dummy variable taking 1 after the reform, X is a vector of control variables
as defined in Table 1, and HQUAL, MQUAL, LQUAL represent country groups according to
their average level of corruption (CC-WGI) during 1996-2005. These are computed by using one
and 0.8 standard deviations from the global CC-WGI average as cut-off points.
This specification provides information on whether the effect of a reform towards indepen-
dence on debt-to-GDP is of different magnitude, depending on whether each country’s insti-
tutional quality in high, medium or low. Table (11) presents results from difference-GMM
estimations. According to our theoretical predictions and assuming the same size of reform for
all countries35 we would expect the positive effect of CBR on (log of) debt-to-GDP to be lower
among countries with higher institutional quality, and then increase for medium to low levels of
institutional quality. As shown in Table 6 and while focusing on short-run effects, we see a con-
sistently statistically significant increase in debt-to-GDP among the medium quality group when
moving towards CBI, in the range of 5.5-8.1 %. This effect is positive but smaller among the
countries with high institutional quality, while it looses significance under some specifications.
This result shows some consistency in the data in relation to our theoretical predictions. For the
same level of reform, we would expect the response of debt-to-GDP to be small (or insignificant)
for countries with very high institutional quality, relative to countries with lower institutional
quality. However, the interaction term among countries suffering from high corruption levels is
always found to be insignificant. This could be either an indication of the ‘reversal’ effect or,
most probably, due to not considering the size of the reforms which, for the majority of this
group were rather small, granting only limited independence to central banks. Nonetheless, we
should notice that we have a proliferation of instruments problem and should treat these findings
with caution.
35Due to the lack of dynamic CBI indices for our panel, the CBR event takes values 0 and 1 before and after
each reform.
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Table 6: Difference - GMM dynamic panel regressions - eq. (11)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lag log(Debt) 0.794 0.758 0.794 0.857 0.784 0.798 0.733
(12.302)*** (14.502)*** (12.230)*** (16.744)*** (12.854)*** (13.263)*** (11.911)***
DEBTRESTR -0.182 -0.155 -0.186 -0.176 -0.180 -0.181 -0.160
(-3.893)*** (-3.274)*** (-3.965)*** (-3.781)*** (-3.885)*** (-3.892)*** (-3.673)***
CRISIS 0.296 0.250 0.293 0.296 0.291 0.296 0.249
(7.038)*** (6.625)*** (7.108)*** (6.300)*** (6.745)*** (7.181)*** (5.849)***
log (RGDPpc) -0.277 -0.268 -0.287 -0.256 -0.284 -0.278 -0.284
(-3.829)*** (-4.212)*** (-3.946)*** (-3.419)*** (-4.144)*** (-4.066)*** (-4.499)***
INF 0.00001 -0.00003 0.00001 -0.00004 -0.00000 0.00001 -0.00002
(0.088) (-0.380) (0.128) (-0.489) (-0.006) (0.098) (-0.234)
FRAC -0.052 -0.069 -0.057 -0.061 -0.035 -0.041 -0.035
(-0.692) (-0.997) (-0.725) (-0.521) (-0.454) (-0.547) (-0.330)
POLAR 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.008
(0.147) (1.168) (0.039) (0.279) (0.229) (0.327) (0.873)
LIEC 0.019 -0.005 0.018 0.009 0.018 0.020 0.023
(0.630) (-0.212) (0.609) (0.289) (0.605) (0.661) (0.618)
HQUAL*CBR 0.073 0.061 0.072 0.031 0.044 0.071 0.059
(1.795)* (1.715)* (1.616) (0.996) (1.456) (1.791)* (1.827)*
MQUAL*CBR 0.081 0.073 0.082 0.054 0.060 0.077 0.070
(2.145)** (1.985)** (2.342)** (1.782)* (1.991)** (2.151)** (1.738)*
LQUAL*CBR -0.002 -0.028 -0.067 0.046 0.059 -0.004 -0.013
(-0.034) (-0.488) (-0.831) (0.638) (0.804) (-0.059) (-0.214)
HIGHDEBT 0.211 0.280
(5.448)*** (4.181)***
0.000 0.000
Obs 1054 1054 1054 1054 1054 1054 1054
Instruments 181 332 181 473 224 221 238
AR(1) test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) test 0.75 0.56 0.79 0.77 0.74 0.75 0.50
In all columns except (3), the grouping of countries is done by 0.8 standard deviations from the global
mean of CC. Columns (1) - (3) assume CBR interaction terms as exogenous and give the one-step estimator.
Columns (4) and (5) assume CBR to be predetermined, while the last two columns consider CBR endogenous.
The Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions is always approaching unity, indicating that we have an
instrument proliferation problem.
5 Conclusion
We develop a two period model where fiscal policy is endogenised; the government provides
public goods and is allowed to issue public debt. The capacity of the tax collection system
is eroded by a corrupt bureaucracy. In this setting we explore the optimality of delegating
monetary policy to an independent central bank. Our main finding suggests that price stability
may be undermined due to strategic use of debt. Corruption and its subsequent fiscal leakages,
restrict the government’s ability to raise revenues through the formal tax system and a purely
independent and conservative central bank is overly restricting seigniorage revenues. This may
induce the government to strategically accumulated debt in order to increase second period
inflation. Thus, despite the fact that the central bank is not fiscally dominated, the government
can still exert upward pressure on long-run price stability, by increasing debt accumulation. This
result may be worsened by the level of corruption.
Reforms towards central bank autonomy have been a general trend around the world in the
past couple of decades. Those countries that are faced with high corruption indices and inefficient
tax-collection systems, as is the problem with many developing and emerging economies, may
have difficulties in achieving their targets. They could experience lower performances in terms
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of controlling inflation compared to countries with high quality of fiscal institutions, due to the
higher incentive of the government to rely on borrowing.
We empirically assess these theoretical findings using event study and DID specifications.
In a cross-sectional large country sample, we provide evidence of a positive and significant cor-
relation between corruption and debt accumulation, given an important central bank reform.
Complementing the analysis with a newly compiled measure for the level of independence sug-
gests that the effect of corruption may be non-linear; the impact of corruption is greater, the
higher the degree of independence granted. More importantly, we also verify our results when
accounting for countries that did not undertake meaningful central bank reforms.
Our findings can provide an explanation for the diverse performance of emerging market
economies that have introduced inflation-targeting regimes or increased the independence status
of their central banks. This is in line with a number of empirical studies suggesting that the
negative relation between legal central bank independence and average inflation is not uniformly
observed, especially among the developing countries. Finally, our results are pointing towards
the importance of fiscal responses, and in particular debt, when analysing the monetary policy
design. This is reflected in the continuously increased focus on debt ceilings (e.g. Growth and
Stability Pact). However, the importance of the fiscal capacity to tax, and the factors that
prevent it, remain vital and should not be neglected.
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A Appendix - Theoretical Model
A.1 Second Best - Equilibrium
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where FR = (1 + ρ)d0 + g
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(Overall financial requirement)
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A.2 Delegation of Monetary Policy
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where Υ = b2λ1ξ2 + abξ1λ2φ+ φ
2
λ2 + b
2
λ1
W = [b2λ1ξ2 + abξ1λ2φ]
2 + b2λ1λ2[φ
2
λ2 + b
2
λ1] and M =
W
b2λ1λ2Υ
1. ξi = λi, i = 1, 2: The solution in Table A.2 reduces to the outcome obtained under discre-
tionary centralised policies (Section 3.2).
2. ξi ≤ λi, i = 1, 2: Monetary policy is delegated to a more conservative central bank. With
optimally delegated parameters in accordance to bλ1ξ2 + aξ1λ2φ − bλ1λ2 = 0 the commitment
outcome is achieved.
3. ξ2 = 0 & ξ1 6= λ1: Monetary policy is set by a conservative and purely independent central
bank. In this case, M|ξ2=0 = N < 1 ∀ ξ1 <
b
aφ
λ1, and thus d
ICB > dSB.
32
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
A.3 Proofs to Propositions 2-4
Debt Dynamics under CBI
∂dICB1
∂ξ1
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∂dICB1
∂N
∂N
∂ξ1
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∂dICB1
∂φ
=
∂dICB1
∂N
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< 0
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λ1Ψ2
{
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2λ2) [v] + a
2bξ21λ2φ
2
}
(A.1)
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2λ1λ2 + 2φ
2λ2) + (φ
2λ2)
2(a2ξ21 + λ1)
}
When (ξ1, φ) are such that v > 0, then both the direct and cross partial derivatives of ξ1, φ on
the effective discount factor are positive. Otherwise,
∂N
∂ξ1
= 0⇒ ξ˜1 =
[
B(B + b2λ1λ2)
]1/2
−B
abλ2φ
. For ξ1 > ξ˜1,
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. For φ > φ˜,
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with B = φ2λ2 + b
2λ1 and X = aξ1
Also, it is straightforward to show that when (ξ1, φ) are such that
∂N
∂ξ1
> 0, this ensures that
∂N
∂φ
> 0 and ∂N
2
∂ξ1∂φ
> 0. This proves Proposition 4.
Case 1 If v > 0⇒ ∂N
∂ξ1
> 0, ∂N
∂φ
> 0 and ∂N
2
∂ξ1∂φ
> 0.
Case 2 If v < 0, then let 2aξ1φ− bλ1 = −z. And in
∂N
∂ξ1
as shown in equation (A.1) above, let
a2bξ21λ2φ
2 = s.
If
∂N
∂ξ1
> 0 then s > b2λ1z + φ
2λ2z (A.4)
For ∂N
∂φ
> 0 (equation (A.2)) it is sufficient to show that a2ξ21λ2φ
2 > bλ1z or
a2bξ21λ2φ2 > b
2λ1z ⇔ s > b
2λ1z (A.5)
(A.5) always holds if condition (A.3) holds as φ2λ2z > 0. Thus,
∂N
∂ξ1
> 0⇒ ∂N
∂φ
> 0.
For ∂N
2
∂ξ1∂φ
> 0 it is sufficient that a2bξ21λ2φ
2 − φ2λ2z > 0, a
2ξ21λ2φ
2 − bλ1z > 0 and Ξ > 0.
Ξ as defined in the table above is always positive. For the first two terms,
a2bξ21λ2φ
2 − φ2λ22z > 0 and b(a
2ξ21λ2φ
2)− b2λ1z > 0
s > φ2λ2z and s > b
2λ1z (A.6)
Conditions (A.6) are true as long as (A.3) holds. Thus, ∂N
∂ξ1
> 0⇒ ∂N
∂φ
> 0 and ∂N
2
∂ξ1∂φ
> 0.
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B Appendix - Empirical Model
Table B.1: Classification of countries-reforms according their updated GMT-index
ihigh iumed ilmed ilow
COUNTRY - YEAR COUNTRY - YEAR COUNTRY - YEAR COUNTRY - YEAR
Finland 1999 Iceland 2001 Australia 1993 New Zealand 1990
Sweden 1999 Denmark 1998 UK 1992 Singapore 1998
Switzerland 2000 Netherlands 1994 Canada 2001 Sweden 1995
Austria 1999 UK 1998 Malta 1994 Norway 2000
Netherlands 1999 Canada 1991 Uruguay 1995 Belgium 1993
Luxembourg 1999 France 1994 Cyprus 2002 Ireland 1989
Germany 1994 Spain 1994 Hungary 1991 Japan 1998
Germany 1999 Malta 2002 Hungary 1997 Barbados 1992
France 1999 Slovenia 1993 Greece 1994 Portugal 1995
Belgium 1999 Slovenia 2002 Slovak R. 1993 Israel 1997
Ireland 1999 Italy 1993 Slovak R. 2001 Oman 2001
Chile 1989 Tunisia 2000 Colombia 1993 Qatar 1997
Chile 2000 Czech R. 1993 Colombia 2000 Jordan 1992
Spain 1999 Costa Rica 1995 Trinidad & Tob. 1994 Malaysia 1994
Portugal 1999 El Salvador 1991 Brazil 1999 S. Korea 1998
Italy 1999 Latvia 1994 Poland 1992 S. Africa 1996
Czech R. 1998 Mexico 1999 China,P.R. 1995 S. Africa 2000
Greece 1998 Turkey 2001 Morocco 1993 Namibia 1998
El Salvador 1996 Poland 1998 Rwanda 1997 Thailand 2000
Latvia 1998 Moldova 1995 Honduras 1997 Ghana 2002
Mexico 1994 Ecuador 1992 Nicaragua 1992 Egypt 1998
Peru 1993 Ecuador 1998 Nicaragua 1999 Lesotho 2000
Peru 2002 Georgia 1996 Philippines 1993 Uganda 1993
Bolivia 1995 Venezuela, R. B. 1993 Philippines 2002 Burundi 1993
Kyrgyz R. 1997 Venezuela, R. B. 2001 Albania 1996 Ethiopia 1994
Paraguay 1995 Russia 1995 Nigeria 1999
Sierra Leone 2000
Indonesia 1999
Kenya 1997
See Dimakou (2010) for detailed sources and scores.
Table B.2: Countries in each control dummy
Empirical Specification: eq. (8)
HIPC Ghana (2002), Rwanda (1997), Honduras (1997), Nicaragua (1999), Bolivia (1995), Sierra
Leone (2000). Source: www.worldbank.org/hipc
HIGHDB Belgium (1993 & 1999), Ireland (1989), Israel (1997), Jordan (1992), Italy (1993 & 1999),
Greece (1994 & 1998), Ghana (2002), Egypt (1998), Poland (1992), Morocco (1993), Rwanda
(1997), Honduras (1997), Nicaragua (1992 & 1999), Uganda (1993), Sierra Leone (2000),
Burundi (1993), Ethiopia (1994), Hungary (1997), Peru (1993)
CRISIS United Kingdom (1992), Germany (1994), France (1994), Spain (1994), Italy (1993), Korea
(1998), Colombia (2000), Thailand (2000), Mexico (1994), Paraguay (1995), Turkey (2001),
China, P.R. (1995), Moldova (1995), Ecuador (1998), Albania (1996), Russia (1995), Kyrgyz
R. (1997), Indonesia (1999). Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).
DSYS Burundi (1993), Czech Rep. (1993), Ethiopia (1994), Hungary (1991), Israel (1997), Latvia
(1994), Poland (1992), Rwanda (1997), Slovakia (1993), Slovenia (1993)
Empirical Specification: eq. (9)
Control Group Consists of all countries with CBI ≤ 8, as well as: Bahamas, Belarus, Bulgaria, Congo, DR,
India, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Ukraine, USA and Zambia
There are minor changes in the rest of the control groups. See supplementary material for more details.
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The table below presents selected results of robustness tests. The first three columns refer to
eq. (8). Columns (1) and (2) use the CC-WGI index as of 1996, while for the rest of the columns
QUAL is measured by the corruption index of TI as of 2005. Column 3 excludes standardised
residuals greater than 2 (in absolute value). The last three columns refer to the DID specification
in which all inflation targeters are in the treatment group. Here, controlling for standardised
residuals greater than 1.5, we report further results using the CC index and political variables
from DPI. Finally, column (7) reports results where the cut-off point for the control group is
raised to 9 (while accounting for outliers). Results remain overall robust.
Table B.3: Robustness Tests - Selected Regressions: Dependent variable - GD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const. 45.047 42.553 36.043 19.480 19.911 32.693 22.978
(4.886)*** (4.506)*** (5.592)*** (2.600)** (2.146)** (2.362)** (3.320)***
QUAL -4.019 -3.129 -0.062 -0.151 -0.532 -0.331
(-3.596)*** (-3.471)*** (-0.050) (-0.107) (-0.381) (-0.322)
GRGDP -0.833 -0.794 -1.106 -1.020 -1.017 -1.062 -0.926
(-2.428)** (-2.319)** (-4.924)*** (-4.784)*** (-4.773)*** (-5.662)*** (-4.791)***
INF -0.122 -0.122 -0.128 -0.113 -0.109 -0.124 -0.169
(-4.992)*** (-4.671)*** (-9.418)*** (-2.535)** (-2.470)** (-2.732)*** (-4.992)***
HIGHDB/DB -18.866 -21.017 -15.055 -0.111 -0.113 -0.100 -0.111
(-3.862)*** (-4.163)*** (-3.512)*** (-12.404)*** (-12.283)*** (-6.675)*** (-14.155)***
CRISIS 43.017 43.582 39.646 32.928 31.719 31.375 33.630
(4.866)*** (4.967)*** (5.500)*** (5.484)*** (5.429)*** (5.239)*** (5.848)***
HIPC -10.382 -10.839 -5.011 -7.234 -8.381 -6.347 -9.194
(-1.229) (-1.329) (-0.632) (-1.115) (-1.294) (-0.890) (-1.461)
QUAL*IHIGH -4.558
(-3.887)***
QUAL*IUMED -4.331
(-3.039)***
QUAL*ILMED -2.421
(-1.584)
QUAL*ILOW -3.012
(-2.634)**
CBR 18.891 24.715 18.006 17.819
(2.535)** (2.541)** (2.169)** (2.556)**
QUAL*CBR -3.344 -3.814 -3.239 -3.310
(-2.472)** (-2.466)** (-2.163)** (-2.796)***
PRES -4.987
(-0.489)
PAR -4.151
(-0.415)
DSYS -3.770709
(-0.374)
FRAC -13.59066
(-1.081)
POLAR 3.713
(1.766)*
R-square 0.486 0.511 0.594 0.682 0.686 0.691 0.718
Adj. R-square 0.454 0.465 0.566 0.654 0.658 0.642 0.692
SER 24.398 24.158 17.379 13.504 13.423 13.694 12.925
No of Obs. 106 106 95 99 99 96 97
F-stat 13.518 11.145 21.463 24.155 24.587 14.105 27.964
Prob(F-stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: t-ratios in parentheses; * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1% levels of significance
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• Interactions between monetary and fiscal policies in the presence of corruption
• Optimality of central bank independence is questioned and price stability uncer-
tain
• Bureaucratic corruption induces the government to strategically accumulate debt
• Results are supported empirically in a cross-section event study and DID setting
• More corruption is associated with higher debt accumulation given central bank
reforms
1
Highlights
